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ARTICLE
W. Bradley Wendel
Autonomy Isn’t Everything:
Some Cautionary Notes on McCoy v. Louisiana
Abstract.
The
Supreme
Court’s
May
2018
decision
in McCoy v. Louisiana has been hailed as a decisive statement of the
priority of the value of a criminal defendant’s autonomy over the fairness and
reliability interests that also inform both the Sixth Amendment and the ethical
obligations of defense counsel. It also appears to be a victory for the vision of
client-centered representation and the humanistic value of the inherent dignity
of the accused. However, the decision is susceptible to being read too broadly
in ways that harm certain categories of defendants. This paper offers
a couple of cautionary notes, in response to McCoy, regarding the ethical
obligations of defense counsel. The most important caution is that, as a matter
of constitutional law and professional ethics, the preference for autonomy and
the standard allocation of decision-making authority presupposes a fully
competent client, not a client who merely passes the extremely low
constitutional bar of competency to stand trial. A client capable of participating
in a fully autonomous way in the representation is far more than minimally
competent. Where the client has diminished capacity to make adequately
considered decisions in connection with a representation, the usual division of
decision-making authority within the lawyer-client relationship breaks
down. The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Indiana v. Edwards muddles the
issue considerably by recognizing a gray area between competency to stand trial
and entitlement to self-representation under Faretta v. California. The selfrepresentation right in Faretta is based on the same autonomy interests that
animate McCoy. Autonomy is a capacity, and the Edwards decision questions
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whether a client lacking this capacity can participate in the representation in the
usual way. Edwards, therefore, casts considerable doubt on whether autonomy
should have the same priority over fairness and reliability interests in a
representation involving a borderline-competent defendant. Observing that a
lawyer’s decision has the effect of limiting the client’s autonomy is the beginning
of the recognition of a complicated issue, not the end of the analysis. In many
cases, the lawyer should respect a client’s fully-informed decision regarding the
representation. There will be other cases, including the representation of
questionably competent clients, in which the client’s autonomy interest must be
subordinated to other legal values. This ranking should not be conducted on
an ad hoc basis but in a principled way. This paper, therefore, proposes a
sliding-scale approach to autonomy and other professional values, in which the
most important consideration is a balance between the importance of the
decision and the client’s capacity to participate in a meaningful way in the
representation. A clearly competent, well-informed client still has the right to
make what a lawyer believes to be unreasonable decisions regarding the
representation. However, the threshold for concluding that a client is
competent and that a decision is fully informed should be set sufficiently high
to ensure the protection of “gray area” clients, and also to provide appropriate
incentives to trial counsel to conduct a thorough investigation and mount an
effective defense.
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from Rice University, a J.D. from Duke Law School, and an L.L.M. and J.S.D.
from Columbia Law School. He is the author of Lawyers and Fidelity to
Law (Princeton
University
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I. THE PROBLEM AND THE MCCOY DECISION
You are a lawyer assigned to represent a defendant charged with three
counts of first-degree murder; the state gave notice of its intent to seek the
death penalty. The physical and circumstantial evidence against your client
is overwhelming, including security camera footage, cell phone records, a
frantic 911 call from one of the victims, a prior incident of domestic violence
against a relative of the victims, and ballistics tests matching the defendant’s
handgun to the .380 rounds that killed the victims, which a witness testified
to having bought with the defendant at Wal-Mart.1 Your client, however,
1. State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 541–44 (La. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018); see also
McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1513 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The evidence against [McCoy]
was truly ‘overwhelming,’ as the Louisiana Supreme Court aptly noted.” (citing McCoy, 218 So. 3d
at 565)).
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adamantly insists that he is innocent. When you ask him to explain how
those three people ended up dead, he tells an elaborate story of a massive
conspiracy in which every law enforcement officer involved in the multistate manhunt and investigation was corrupt, dealing drugs, and somehow
had an incentive to murder the victims.2 After attempting to verify the
details of your client’s story and finding that none of them check out, and
mindful of the importance of presenting a defense that is consistent
throughout the guilt and penalty phases of the trial,3 you conclude that the
defendant’s best hope for avoiding a death sentence is to admit to having
committed the crimes, but rely on mitigating evidence showing that the
defendant does not deserve death due to his severe mental and emotional
issues.4 You try every technique you have learned over the years to persuade
your client of the wisdom of this strategy, but he continues to maintain that
he did not commit the murders. He does not avow any other ethical
commitment, such as the desire to take responsibility for his crimes, which
would explain his insistence on pursuing this defense strategy. Instead, he
simply insists that he did not do it. What do you do, and what professional

2. McCoy, 218 So. 3d at 549 n.15. The U.S. Supreme Court characterized the story as “an alibi
difficult to fathom.” McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1507.
3. Experienced capital defense lawyers understand—and this has been confirmed by empirical
investigation—that it is a losing strategy for the defendant to claim innocence during the guilt phase
of the trial and then argue for life during the sentencing phase. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson
& Scott E. Sundby, Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity of Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell
Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1044 (2008) (“[M]ost jurors enter the penalty phase
with their minds already made up as to the appropriate sentence.”); see also Scott E. Sundby, Capital Jury
and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy Remorse and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557,
1588–89 (1998) (“[I]f the defense does not approach a capital case, even though it is bifurcated, as a
unified presentation, it greatly increases the risk that the guilt-phase presentation will doom the case in
mitigation during the penalty phase.”). Sundby’s study showed that juries impose a death sentence far
more frequently in cases in which the defendant denies guilt than in cases in which the defendant
admits guilt and demonstrates remorse. Sundby, supra, at 1589. The optimal strategy for the defense
team is thus to humanize the defendant throughout the trial, ensuring he (or she—although the
overwhelming number of capital defendants are men) does not appear to the jury to be remorseless.
Blume, Johnson & Sundby, supra, at 1038–39, 1049–50. Actively contesting guilt during the guilt-orinnocence phase risks angering jurors, who then view evidence presented in the mitigation phase as
nothing more than another attempt by the defendant to avoid responsibility. Id. at 1044–45.
4. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1055–71 (2003) (noting the importance of consistency and that
“counsel risks losing credibility by making an unconvincing argument in the first phase that the
defendant did not commit the crime, then attempting to show in the penalty phase why the client
committed the crime”).
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ethical values—whether or not they are contained in your state’s rules of
professional conduct5—inform that judgment?
There are two general answers to that question, representing two distinct
clusters of professional ethical values. The first is oriented toward the
client’s legal rights. It emphasizes the lawyer’s obligation to use care, skill,
and diligence to protect those rights, but also qualifies these client-regarding
duties with constraints on deception and abuse of legal processes.6 Lawyers
must provide reasonably effective assistance to their clients,7 and are
presumed to have the capacity their clients lack to make professional
judgments in the course of the representation.8 The lawyer’s fiduciary duty
is certainly to protect the client, but the contours of that duty are informed
by the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which is to ensure
that criminal defendants receive a fair trial through reliable proceedings.9
As a result, the defense lawyer is not a “mouthpiece or marionette” for the
defendant,10 but a professional who must use experience and judgment in
carrying out the objectives of the representation. Lawyers do not pursue
their clients’ objectives unmodified, but their lawful objectives,11 or their
legal rights. A client’s asserted interest is the starting point for the lawyer’s
ethical analysis, but the lawyer must also consider the content of the client’s
legal entitlements.
5. Every lawyer in the United States is subject to professional conduct rules promulgated by
courts in the lawyer’s state of admission. Lawyers often refer to these as rules of ethics, which tends
to create unnecessary confusion with the idea of ethics as beliefs about what one ought to do when
considering the impact of the decisions on others. David Copp, Introduction: Metaethics and Normative
Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY 3, 4 (David Copp ed. 2006). Ethics in this
sense (which, following most ethicists, I will use interchangeably with morality) is distinct from custom,
tradition, etiquette, self-interest, and the requirements of law, which is why the term “legal ethics” is
notoriously ambiguous. Id.
6. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (stating the lawyer’s overarching duty to
advocate the client’s cause is “limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of
a trial as a search for truth”).
7. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (defining the lawyer’s basic duty as
“bring[ing] to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process”
(citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))).
8. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (emphasizing “the superior ability of trained
counsel” to select arguments for appeal (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963))).
9. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90.
10. People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 693 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (citing People v. Schultheis,
638 P.2d 8, 12 (Colo. 1981)).
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (AM. LAW INST.
2001).
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More generally, society as a whole has an interest in ensuring that the
power of the state is not misused by inflicting punishment on innocent
people.12 This interest is conceptually independent of the defendant’s
interest in controlling his defense. Influenced primarily by these societal
values, a lawyer may believe that the most ethical course of action is to do
anything possible to prevent the client from putting on a preposterous
defense. The result of acquiescing to the client’s directive will almost
certainly be a death sentence, which may be avoidable with a well-crafted
mitigation case. Landmark Supreme Court decisions such as Strickland v.
Washington13 emphasize the importance of independent professional
judgment and deference to the strategic choices of counsel; this deference,
in turn, is justified by the assumption that a lawyer will comply with her
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and provide vigorous advocacy for her
client’s cause.14 In the hypothetical, the lawyer’s most important duty
would be to do whatever it takes to convince the client not to rely on a story
that will likely result in execution. Doing so not only respects the client’s
legal rights, but also supports the proper functioning of the criminal justice
system.
The second answer focuses not on the values of professional judgment
and the reliability and fairness of the proceedings, but on the defendant’s
autonomy. The Supreme Court held, in Faretta v. California,15 that a
defendant who voluntarily and intelligently elects to represent himself at trial
has a constitutional right to do so.16 The Court has also held that a
defendant has the exclusive authority to make decisions about such
fundamental matters as whether to take the stand,17 waive a jury trial,18 or

12. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing, in the
context of a capital case, that the Eighth Amendment “expresses a fundamental interest of society in
ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments”); see also Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 617 (2000) (contending an autonomous choice does not transform an
unconstitutional punishment into a constitutional one).
13. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
14. See id. at 688 (“The Sixth Amendment . . . . relies . . . on the legal profession’s maintenance
of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary
process that the Amendment envisions.” (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 100–101 (1955))).
15. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
16. Id. at 832.
17. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964).
18. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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plead guilty.19 The lawyer disciplinary rules recognize an allocation of
decision-making authority between clients and lawyers, with clients having
the exclusive authority to make decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation.20 Tracking the constitutional entitlements of criminal
defendants, the rules provide that in the criminal defense context, a lawyer
must abide by the client’s decisions about the plea to enter, whether to waive
jury trial, and whether to testify.21 In addition, for the last several decades,
legal scholars, particularly those associated with the clinical legal education
movement, have advocated a model of client-centered representation.22
One important implication of client-centered representation is that lawyers
should not assume that a client’s values, cares, and commitments are
exhausted by the client’s legal interests.23 A client may prefer a course of
action that a reasonable lawyer would recognize as making the client worse
off, legally speaking.24 But the client should be allowed to control his own
19. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“[A] lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . . In a criminal case, the
lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.”).
21. Id.
22. See generally DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (3d ed. 2012) (challenging lawyers to adopt a client-centered approach when gathering
information from clients, developing the client’s story from their perspective, and when counseling
clients so that they may make better decisions regarding their own legal objectives); see also Katherine
R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369,
370–71 (2006) (“[T]he client-centered approach has so thoroughly permeated skills training and clinical
legal education, it is not an exaggeration to say that client-centered representation is one of the most
influential doctrines in legal education today.”); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling:
Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 510 (1990) (“The [Binder and Price client-centered]
model’s emphasis on the client’s role in the counseling process provides a needed response to the worst
excesses of the traditional lawyer-dominated model of counseling.”). But see Binny Miller, Give Them
Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 (1995) (“The
critical and client-centered movements add to our understanding of the role that client voices can and
should play in legal representation. But in a rush to embrace client voice, these scholars have virtually
ignored the critical role that case theory can play in linking client stories to the narratives that lawyers
tell on behalf of clients.”).
23. See Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
103, 127–28 (2010) (discussing the importance of recognizing the broad scope of clients’ interests in
client-centered representation).
24. See id. (differentiating between counseling with a holistic approach to representation versus
a purely legal approach). In his classic article, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, David Luban offers a
series of hypothetical examples to illustrate the divergence between the legal interests of clients and
other values, cares, and commitments. David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L.
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fate.25 Respecting the value of client autonomy may require the lawyer to
accept the client’s instructions, even if it spells disaster for the client’s case.
As will be discussed further below, however, respect for the value of
autonomy presupposes that the client is competent to make informed
decisions concerning the representation. When that assumption does not
hold, the lawyer’s ethical responsibilities become much more nuanced.
Legal scholars have split on whether the first or second answer represents
the most ethical course of action for the lawyer in this case.26 Near the end
of the 2017–18 term, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case on which the
opening hypothetical was based, decisively chose the autonomy-centered
approach.27 It held that even where experienced defense counsel
reasonably believes that conceding guilt would offer the defendant the best
chance to avoid the death penalty, the defendant is entitled to insist at trial

REV. 454, 455–57 (1981). For example, he imagines a case in which a workers’ compensation award
could be increased by showing that a physical injury in the workplace was “exacerbated by
psychosomatic factors.” Id. at 456. However, the “client is a proud 55-year old Slovenian-American
machinist who . . . . indignantly refuses to see a psychiatrist, now or ever[,]” stating that “[p]sychiatrists
are for crazy people.” Id. He concludes with an example from a great American country song
(originally recorded by Lefty Frizzell, and covered by Johnny Cash, the Band, the Chieftains, the
Proclaimers, and many other artists) in which the defendant refuses to offer a solid alibi defense to a
murder charge because it would require him to admit that he had been in bed with his best friend’s
wife. Id.
25. See United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (“It is important to
remember that while defense counsel serves as an advocate for the client, it is the client who is the
master of his or her own defense.” (citing Mulligan v. Kemp, 771 F.2d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1985))).
26. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (1988)
(“Specifically, some argue that attorneys should ignore the wishes of clients who prefer execution so
as not to frustrate the judicial obligation to assure that death sentences are valid before they are carried
out. . . . [T]his line of argument is fundamentally incompatible not only with traditional conceptions
of an attorney’s duty to respect the autonomy of a competent client, but also with prevailing preference
for judicial restraint.”); see also Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right
to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1163-74 (2010) (“Because completely depriving the defendant
of control over the case is not necessary for the criminal justice system to function, the concomitant
autonomy infringement cannot be justified.”); Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant
Autonomy,83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 623 (2005) (asserting “the very idea of defendant autonomy is
philosophically incoherent and inconsistent with other fundamental traditions of American criminal
justice”); Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital Defendant Who Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetoric
of Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 699 (2006) (finding
a false dichotomy between autonomy and reliability in a criminal defense).
27. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1511 (2018) (“Here, however, the violation of McCoy’s
protected autonomy right was complete when the court allowed counsel to usurp control of an issue
within McCoy’s sole prerogative.”).
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on his innocence.28 Picking up on arguments from the client-centered
representation movement, Justice Ginsburg noted that the client’s objective
may not be simply to avoid death.29 Rather, “He may wish to avoid, above
all else, the opprobrium that comes with admitting he killed family members.
Or he may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk death for
any hope, however small, of exoneration.”30 Thus, the lawyer had an
obligation to put on the defense the client wanted, no matter how illconsidered the lawyer believed the client’s decision to be.
In Justice Ginsburg’s version of the story, lawyers are, at most,
supporting characters. Citing Faretta,31 she noted that, historically speaking,
self-representation was the norm.32 Even when the right to the assistance
of counsel was recognized, and explicitly provided for in the Sixth
Amendment, the right is personal to the accused and, structurally,
establishes a division of authority with respect to trial strategy.33 Tracking
the distinction in Model Rule 1.2(a) between the objectives of the
representation and the means by which they are to be pursued,34

28. See id. at 1509 (“If, after consultations with [defense attorney] English concerning the
management of the defense, McCoy disagreed with English’s proposal to concede McCoy committed
three murders, it was not open to English to override McCoy’s objection.”).
29. Id. at 1508 (“Counsel may reasonably assess a concession of guilt as best suited to avoiding
the death penalty, as English did in this case. But, the client may not share that objective.”).
30. Id. (citing Hashimoto, supra note 26, at 1178); see also Richard W. Garnett, Sectarian Reflections
on Lawyers’ Ethics and Death Row Volunteers, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 804 (2002) (observing death
row inmates who direct their attorneys to waive appeals may be motivated by “stoic resignation,
genuine remorse, the assurances of faith, or the peace that follows contrition”).
31. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
32. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1507. Supporters of Faretta and the autonomy interest in criminal
defense representation are fond of pointing out that the only English tribunal not to allow selfrepresentation was the Star Chamber. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821 (“[T]he Star Chamber has for
centuries symbolized disregard of basic individual rights. [It] not merely allowed but required
defendants to have counsel.” (citing L. FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 23 (1973))); Ashley
G. Hawkinson, Comment, The Right of Self-Representation Revisited: A Return to the Star Chamber’s Disrespect
for Defendant Autonomy? [Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 465, 474–75
(2009) (analyzing the development of self-representation in American colonial law). The rhetorical
impact of the comparison is undeniable, although ironic, because the Star Chamber was used by the
king to keep “great and powerful men” under his thumb, while modern defendants seeking to proceed
pro se under Faretta are among the most powerless in society. See Ryan Patrick Alford, The Star Chamber
and the Regulation of the Legal Profession 1570–1640, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 639, 650 (2011) (“[T]he core
jurisdiction of the Court of Star Chamber . . . was closely related to the concern that abuses of powerful
men could not otherwise be adequately addressed.”).
33. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508–09.
34. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).

2018]

Autonomy Isn’t Everything: Some Cautionary Notes on McCoy v. Louisiana

101

Justice Ginsburg concluded that McCoy’s trial counsel impermissibly
overrode his decision to contest the state’s evidence that he had committed
the murders.35 Furthermore, the trial court’s error in permitting McCoy’s
35. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1509. The Court considered other arguments by the state, which will
not be considered in detail here, owing to the focus of this Article on the relative priority of the
defendant’s autonomy interest. The majority correctly rejected the state’s argument that Rule 1.2(d) of
the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct (identical to Model Rule 1.2(d)) prohibited trial counsel
from arguing that McCoy was factually innocent. Id. at 1510. Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer may not
assist a client in conduct “that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(d). The most plausible crime or fraud involved in the defense of McCoy’s case would
be perjury which, as Justice Ginsburg rightly notes, presents special difficulties for defense counsel.
McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1510. However, she came dangerously close to misreading Rule 3.3(a), which is
the prohibition in the Louisiana Rules (and the Model Rules) on presenting false evidence. Id. She
observes that trial counsel “harbored no doubt that McCoy believed what he was saying.” Id. The test
for a violation of Rule 3.3(a), however, is not whether the client sincerely believes, in perfect subjective
good faith, that he is telling the truth; rather, it is whether the lawyer knows that the evidence is false.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3). “Knows” and “knowledge” are defined terms in
the Rules of Professional Conduct and refer to “actual knowledge of the fact in question.” Id. R. 1.0(f).
The Louisiana rules are identical to these provisions of the Model Rules. The knowledge in question
is that of the lawyer, not the client. It is certainly true that a lawyer may acquire knowledge of the
falsity of evidence from the client’s statement that he intends to lie on the stand. But a lawyer may also
conclude from other evidence that the client is lying and would then be required by the Rules of
Professional Conduct to avoid introducing the client’s testimony. See, e.g., People v. Andrades,
828 N.E.2d 599, 602–03 (N.Y. 2005) (finding no deprivation of right to effective assistance of counsel
where trial counsel informed the court of an “ethical problem” related to the client’s false testimony).
Suppose in the McCoy case the defendant had denied riding with a trucker from Arkansas to Idaho
(which was material evidence because the state wished to prove that a gun found in the truck was the
murder weapon), and a police dashboard camera clearly showed the defendant getting out of the truck
in Idaho. State v. McCoy, 218 So. 3d 535, 543 n.7 (La. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). If the
defendant insisted on taking the stand and testifying that he had not ridden in the truck, trial counsel
would have a real problem under Rule 3.3(a)(3). Some courts have held that nothing will suffice to
establish defense counsel’s knowledge of client perjury short of a bald statement by the client that the
proposed testimony will be a lie. See United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“Midgett never indicated to his attorney that his testimony would be perjurious. Thus, his lawyer had
a duty to assist Midgett in putting his testimony before the jury . . . .” (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157, 189 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring))); State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 513 (Wis. 2004)
(“Absent the most extraordinary circumstances, such knowledge [of the falsity of the client’s testimony]
must be based on the client’s expressed admission of intent to testify untruthfully.”). Other courts,
however, conclude that a lawyer has the requisite knowledge where the state’s evidence is
overwhelming. United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 813-15 (10th Cir. 1988); People v. DePallo,
754 N.E.2d 751, 753 (N.Y. 2001). The Supreme Court itself has not addressed the weight of evidence
necessary to satisfy the requirement under state rules of professional conduct to avoid presenting false
evidence —nor could it, since this is a matter for state courts. The most the Court can do is what it
did in Nix v. Whiteside and conclude that a lawyer’s conduct that is presumed to be in conformity with
state rules of professional conduct either does or does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel. See Nix, 475 U.S. at 171–72 (following the Court of Appeals in
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trial counsel to interfere with his authority to make strategic decisions about
the objectives of the representation did not affect only McCoy’s interest in
avoiding wrongful conviction. It was structural, affecting his autonomy
interest, which has significance beyond the reliability of the conviction.36
McCoy v. Louisiana37 represents a decisive statement of the priority of the
value of the defendant’s autonomy over the fairness and reliability interests
that also inform both the Sixth Amendment and the ethical obligations of
defense counsel. It appears to be a victory for the vision of client-centered
representation and the humanistic value of the inherent dignity of the
accused. The duties stated in McCoy are less about the lawyer’s professional
duties as an officer of the court and personal integrity and emphasizes
instead the lawyer’s role as an agent of the client. The decision is correct as
far as it goes—that is, on the assumption that a fully-informed, competent
client made a rational decision not to plead guilty after consultation with his
lawyer, who provided reasonable advice regarding the risks and benefits of
going to trial.38 However, one must be careful to understand the principle
in McCoy in light of that crucial assumption.
The most important note of caution to sound about McCoy is that, as a
matter of constitutional law and professional ethics, the preference for
autonomy and the standard allocation of decision-making authority
presupposes a fully competent client, not a client who merely passes the
extremely low constitutional bar of competency to stand trial.39 A client
assuming that the testimony the defendant proposed to give at trial would have been false). Justice
Alito’s dissent rightly notes that this is an issue of state law in which the Court should not involve itself.
McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1513–14 (Alito, J., dissenting). It is entirely possible that trial counsel in McCoy
could have concluded that he had actual knowledge that his client’s testimony would be false and was
therefore duty-bound to take reasonable remedial measures. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 3.3. There is still a further issue of whether overriding the client’s decision to contest his
involvement in the crime was beyond the scope of required remedial measures under Rule 3.3. See Id.
at cmt. 6. Trial counsel could have complied with his obligations under Rule 3.3 by taking less intrusive
remedial measures, such as permitting McCoy to testify in a narrative form. Lowery v. Cardwell,
575 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1978); Andrades, 828 N.E.2d at 604.
36. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511.
37. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).
38. The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right of effective assistance of
counsel extends to the plea-bargaining process and that a defendant may obtain relief on habeas corpus
upon a showing that counsel’s advice regarding a plea offer fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012).
39. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (“[T]he ‘test must be
whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
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capable of participating in a fully autonomous way in the representation is
far more than minimally competent. Where the client has diminished
capacity “to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a
representation,”40 the usual division of decision-making authority within
the lawyer-client relationship breaks down. Unfortunately, the rules of
professional conduct provide very little guidance for lawyers in this
situation, stating only that the lawyer should try, to the extent possible, to
have as normal a lawyer-client relationship as possible.41 A lawyer who
turns to Supreme Court caselaw for clarification will find that the Court
created uncertainty with a 2008 decision, Indiana v. Edwards,42 which
recognized, but did not define, a new intermediate category of “borderline”
or “gray-area” competence to exercise the right of self-representation under
Faretta.43 The self-representation right is based on the same autonomy
interests that animate McCoy. Autonomy is a capacity, and the Edwards
decision questions whether a client lacking this capacity can participate in
the representation in the usual way. Edwards therefore casts considerable
doubt on whether autonomy should have the same priority over fairness
and reliability interests in a representation involving a borderline-competent
defendant.
The other cautionary note regarding McCoy is that the decision may have
the unfortunate tendency to encourage lackadaisical representation by
misguided, overworked, or incompetent lawyers.44 The Supreme Court has

proceedings against him.’”). See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text, for further discussion of the
Dusky competency standard, the Court’s unification of various competency standards in Godinez, and
the uncertainty created by Edwards.
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a). The Louisiana rule is identical. LA.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2002). Furthermore, the relationship between this
standard of competence (or capacity) and criminal law standards of competency will be considered
extensively in Section II.
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a).
42. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008).
43. See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (discussing a defendant’s right to selfrepresentation, even if issues of competence are of concern, is implied in the Sixth Amendment).
Although the Court did not say much about this new category, it is clear that it contemplates a
defendant who is competent to stand trial but may not be competent to participate in the representation
in other respects.
44. In fairness, not all constitutionally ineffective representation is the result of laziness or
incompetence. The excessive workloads of public defender offices, for example, may result in time
pressures that make effective representation all but impossible. See, e.g., Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial
Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 282 (Fla. 2013) (“[A] public defender [should not be prevented] from
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emphasized deference by reviewing courts to strategic decisions by trial
counsel.45 A client may initially be inclined to pursue a hopeless line of
defense, or may wish to present no evidence at all. In capital cases, clients
are often reluctant to allow a thorough investigation and presentation of
evidence in mitigation of a potential death sentence, despite a line of
Supreme Court decisions holding counsel constitutionally ineffective for
failure to conduct a mitigation investigation.46 A lawyer may be too quick
to accept the client’s direction, believing that to be the lesson of McCoy.
Most emphatically, it is not, but the Court’s enthusiasm for client autonomy
and relegation of trial counsel to a merely instrumental role may cause some
less than zealous advocates to give up without a fight.47
The value of autonomy informs not only the representation of clients by
lawyers, but many other relationships between individuals and institutions
in an advanced society. This is necessarily true when the information and
capacity necessary to make autonomous choices lies beyond the ability of
individuals without specialized training. Professionals such as lawyers and
physicians are necessary to help people realize their conceptions of a
worthwhile life, and we all must place a great deal of trust in their
commitment to ethical norms of loyalty and trustworthiness. Much of the
theoretical reflection on the relative priority of autonomy and other values
originates in medicine and clinical bioethics, and it is particularly salient in
the development of principles of informed consent.48 The rejection of
filing a motion to withdraw based on excessive caseload[s] or underfunding that would result in
ineffective representation of indigent defendants . . . .”).
45. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984).
46. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534–35 (2003);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 363–64 (2000).
47. See, e.g., DeBruce v. Comm’r, Ala. Dept. Corr., 758 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2014)
(reaffirming the Supreme Court’s position that a defendant is prejudiced in cases where counsel omits
or fails to introduce mitigating evidence of the defendant’s cognitive/mental impairments). In that
case, trial counsel conducted virtually no mitigation investigation, despite evidence that the defendant
exhibited signs of significant cognitive deficiencies and substance abuse. Id. The state said trial
counsel’s decision was strategic, but the Eleventh Circuit concluded it was based on an unreasonable
understanding of the applicable law. Id. at 1274–75. The point of mentioning this case in connection
with McCoy is that it may be too easy for trial counsel to make what they believe is a strategic decision
to provide a less effective defense if they are representing a client who, because of depression,
confusion, mental illness, or simple exhaustion, instructs the lawyer not to pursue a reasonable
investigation.
48. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 120–
81 (4th ed. 1994); H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 262–84
(1986); ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN BIOETHICS 28–48 (2002).
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medical paternalism and the centrality of informed consent in the doctorpatient relationship soon came to be reflected in the law, not only in the tort
principles that regulated medical decision-making, but also in the regulation
of the lawyer-client relationship.49 Autonomy is now arguably seen as the
central organizing value in legal ethics, just as in biomedical ethics. As in
the latter discipline, however, we may ask whether the only, or the most
important, ethical issue is whether a patient or client has consented to some
course of action. Other values should inform professional ethics—in
medicine, promoting the patient’s health and well-being (the principle of
beneficence), and in law, the reliability of judicial proceedings and the fair
administration of justice.
Observing that a lawyer’s decision has the effect of limiting the client’s
autonomy is the beginning of the recognition of a complicated issue, not the
end of the analysis. In many cases the lawyer should respect a client’s fullyinformed decision regarding the representation. There will be other cases,
including the representation of questionably competent clients, in which the
client’s autonomy interest must be subordinated to other legal values. This
ranking should not be conducted on an ad hoc basis but in a principled way.
This Article therefore proposes a sliding-scale approach to autonomy and
other professional values, in which the most important consideration is a
balance between the importance of the decision and the client’s capacity to
participate in a meaningful way in the representation. A clearly competent,
well-informed client still has the right to make what a lawyer believes to be
unreasonable decisions regarding the representation. However, the
threshold for concluding that a client is competent and that a decision is
fully informed should be set sufficiently high to ensure the protection of
49. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 729 (1987) (discussing the
importance of autonomy in decisionmaking and noting “[i]f [attorneys] accept that clients are
competent—entitled—to make decisions, then we should also accept that they are competent to
choose a decisionmaking method as well”); see also Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of
Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307, 310 (1980) (putting forth the argument for attorneys to adopt
informed consent as the “process-oriented standard for enforcing competency in the legal
profession”); Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1049, 1061 (1984) (reviewing attorney obligations under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in comparison to a client’s ability to manifest informed consent); Marcy
Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV.
315, 332 (1987) (addressing the views associated with informed consent in the context of a lawyerclient relationship); Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory,
65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 753–55 (1986) (reviewing the legal characteristics and case history of informed
consent).
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“gray area” clients, and also to provide appropriate incentives to trial counsel
to conduct a thorough investigation and mount an effective defense.
The argument in the Article is structured as follows. Section II looks
beyond McCoy to the general problem of representing borderline-competent
clients. Under both Sixth Amendment principles and the law governing
lawyers, it is far from clear what a lawyer should do when confronted by a
client with diminished decision-making capacity who insists on pursuing a
course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes will result in disaster at
trial. The Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards seems to muddle the issue
by recognizing an ill-defined category of “gray area” competency.50 The
representation of questionably competent clients may necessarily involve an
infringement on what would be the autonomy interest of a fully competent
client. Section III considers the relationship between autonomy and other
ethical values as a theoretical matter, drawing from moral and political
philosophy, and from the extensive literature in biomedical ethics.
Bioethicists have considered numerous justifications for intervention
notwithstanding purportedly autonomous patient decisions, the nature of
the various countervailing interests, and the competency standards that must
be satisfied in order to conclude that there has been informed consent. One
cross-disciplinary takeaway is that law could benefit from greater attention
to the interests at stake and a more nuanced analysis of competency. The
“gray area” category in Edwards is actually not a muddle but a promising
solution to the problem of representing defendants like Robert McCoy. In
many cases in this middle zone of competency, the best ethical and
constitutional course of action for lawyers will be to act on fairness and
reliability considerations, not the client’s expressed preferences. Section IV
concludes by looking more specifically at what ethically may be done in the
course of representing gray area defendants.
II. AUTONOMY AND THE QUESTIONABLY COMPETENT CLIENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
The problem considered in McCoy is certainly not new. Criminal
procedure scholars and clinical teachers have been aware for decades that
the tension between the values of client autonomy and procedural fairness
is exacerbated tremendously by clients whose decision-making capacity is
impaired by mental illness, developmental disability, childhood abuse,
50. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 172–73 (2008).
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trauma, or otherwise.51 The Court in McCoy cited other state court decisions
involving defendants who insisted that their counsel put on hopeless
defenses that fly in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt.52 The
problem is sometimes discussed in the context of death-row “volunteers”—
that is, inmates who direct their attorneys not to put on a mitigation case, or
to waive appeals or collateral review, knowing that the result will be a
speedier execution of the death penalty.53 In any case, in the background
of the debate lurk doctrinal complexities and empirical uncertainty
concerning the competence of clients to participate in the representation.

51. See John D. King, Candor, Zeal, and the Substitution of Judgment: Ethics and the Mentally Ill Criminal
Defendant, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 211 (2008) (“In cases involving criminal defendants suffering serious
mental impairment, the very reasoning behind the model of . . . client autonomy can fall apart,
especially in cases . . . [where defendants] . . . are ‘decisionally incompetent’ and, therefore, unable
meaningfully to assist in their own defenses.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Josephine Ross,
Autonomy Versus a Client’s Best Interests: The Defense Lawyer’s Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control
Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343, 1353–54 (1998) (discussing trial defense tactics and the
challenges associated when raising the “[i]ncompetency to [s]tand [t]rial” defense); Paul R. Tremblay,
On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L.
REV. 515, 519–20 (1987) (addressing the various options available to lawyers when representing a client
with issues of mental competence); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in
Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65, 69
(1988) (highlighting the difficulties faced by a criminal defense lawyer when representing a mentally
impaired client, particularly as it pertains to the client’s ability to produce informed consent).
52. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1507 (2018) (citing Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803 (Del.
2009); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138 (Kan. 2000)); id. at 1510 (citing People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686,
691 (Colo. 2010)).
53. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV.
939, 942 (2005) (studying the competency of “volunteer” inmates on death-row who seek speedier
executions by directing their attorneys not to pursue mitigation evidence, and the ethical complications
faced by the attorney who follows the client’s direction and indirectly engages in assisted-suicide); see
also Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to
Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95, 143 (1987) (arguing
defense attorneys should not be required to present mitigating evidence when the defendant clearly
states that they want no efforts to be made on behalf of life; conversely, Carter argues for court
appointed attorneys to present mitigating evidence in situations where defendants are advocating for
their death); Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s
Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 78 (2002)
(contending a defendant should be able to accept the death sentence and waive proceedings, however,
not at the trial stages of pleading); Garnett, supra note 30, 804 (explaining the waiver of appeals by
death row inmates); C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death Row
Volunteering, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 849, 856 (2000) (discussing the ethical dilemmas created during
post-conviction appeals and the resulting tug-of-war between the “volunteer” defendant seeking an
expedited death sentence versus the defense attorney zealously advocating to save the client’s life);
Williams, supra note 26, 699 (exploring autonomy for criminal defendants).
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Before considering the conflict between autonomy and other values in
hard cases, it is important to point out that there are many easy cases where
a lawyer need not defer to the client’s expressed preferences. State rules of
professional conduct recognize a distinction between decisions concerning
the objectives of the representation and those concerning the means by
which they are to be pursued; the former decisions are for the client to make,
and while lawyers should consult with clients about means decisions, they
are presumptively within the lawyer’s authority.54 The client may be “the
master of his or her own defense[,]”55 but the lawyer is “captain of the
ship”56 when it comes to matters of trial strategy. The Supreme Court has
emphasized that “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance
in any given case[,]”57 that reviewing courts should not second-guess the
judgments of trial counsel,58 and that the client is not entitled to be
consulted on every tactical decision.59 Strategic choices made after a
reasonable investigation (where the reasonableness of the investigation is

54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). Justice Ginsburg in
McCoy analyzes defense counsel’s argument, in which he conceded his client’s guilt, to a guilty plea.
McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508. Interestingly, in an earlier case she criticized a state court for equating
defense counsel’s concession argument to a guilty plea. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004)
(“On the record thus far developed [in the state court], [the defense counsel’s] concession of [the
defendant’s] guilt does not rank as a ‘failure to function in any meaningful sense as the Government’s
adversary.’” (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662, 666 (1984))). In Nixon the defendant
was unresponsive when his lawyer attempted to discuss trial strategy with him. See id. at 181. Because
his silence did not constitute express consent, the Florida Supreme Court believed it was not sufficient
to support a guilty plea; the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, however, that the lawyer’s decision fell
within the range of reasonable professional judgment, particularly in the context of a capital case with
its characteristic two-stage adjudication. Id. 190–91. Experienced capital defense lawyers recognize
that it would be counterproductive to argue innocence and then try to make a sound mitigation case.
Id. Thus, a reasonable lawyer might decide to “attempt[] to impress the jury with his candor and his
unwillingness to engage in ‘a useless charade’” while arguing to spare the defendant’s life. Id. at 192
(quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656–57 n.19). The Court in McCoy distinguished Nixon because, in the
latter case, the client was unresponsive while the client adamantly objected to his lawyer’s strategy in
the former case. But the principle stated in Nixon, that defense counsel sometimes must make the hard
decision to concede guilt and make the strongest possible case in the penalty phase of the trial, will
have considerable weight in the representation of borderline-competent clients.
55. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Mulligan v. Kemp,
771 F.2d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1985)).
56. Bergerud, 223 P.3d at 693 (quoting Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2008)).
57. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
58. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983).
59. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988).
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itself a question of reasonable professional judgment) are virtually
unchallengeable.60
Defense lawyers are not deemed to have provided ineffective assistance
of counsel if they make reasonable judgment calls, even if the client
(particularly with the benefit of hindsight) would have preferred a different
approach. For example, in Darden v. Wainwright,61 trial counsel in a capital
case decided not to introduce mitigating evidence because it would have
opened the door to rebuttal evidence that, in the judgment of the defense
lawyers, would have been highly prejudicial to the defendant.62 The Court
held that the lawyers’ actions were within their authority to make decisions
regarding sound trial strategy.63 To be sure, a defense lawyer cannot expect
to utter the magic words “trial strategy” or “reasonable professional
judgment” and avoid scrutiny. There are some mistakes or omissions
unrelated to the objectives of the representation that will require a new trial.
Complete failure to conduct a mitigation investigation, for instance, clearly
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel,64 as does the decision to
introduce testimony by an expert whose report had listed the defendant’s
race as a factor supporting a conclusion of future dangerousness.65 Blatant
legal mistakes caused by failure to perform basic legal research are also not
immunized as judgment calls.66 The lawyer’s judgment with respect to the
60. Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 273–74 (2014).
61. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
62. Id. at 184–85.
63. Id. at 186.
64. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390–91 (2005) (“[C]ounsel’s failure to look at the file
fell below the line of reasonable practice, there is a further question about prejudice, that is, whether
‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)));
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003) (holding failure to present mitigating evidence for a criminal
defendant at trial would support a claim for ineffectiveness of counsel); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 372 (2000) (finding counsel ineffective at trial and listing five categories where counsel failed to
introduce evidence indicating that the case could have resulted differently). Other failures to perform
very basic factual research have been deemed ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Gerisch v. Meadows,
604 S.E.2d 462, 463 (Ga. 2004) (commenting on how a defense lawyer did not determine whether
defendant had in fact been previously convicted on the same charges, which would have supported a
double-jeopardy argument).
65. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017).
66. See Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274–75 (2014) (discussing the failure to discover that
state had made resources available for hiring additional experts); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359
(2010) (addressing the failure to determine that guilty plea would subject client to deportation); Riggs
v. Fairman, 399 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting lawyer’s misunderstanding of California’s
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means of the representation must be, in fact, reasonable. But if it is, then
the client’s autonomy is beside the point. Decisions about trial strategy are
for the lawyer to make.67 The autonomy interest underlying McCoy pertains
only to fundamental decisions about the objectives of the representation.
It is a bedrock principle of constitutional law that a person may not stand
trial who “lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing
his defense.”68 The Supreme Court defined the standard for competency
to stand trial as having two parts: (1) a “sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and
(2) “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.”69 Following those early cases, the Court returned again and again to
“three strikes” law was behind advice to client to turn down an offered plea deal), vacated, 430 F.3d
1222 (9th Cir. 2005).
67. The principle stated in text must be qualified to the following extent. The rules of
professional conduct provide that the lawyer “shall consult with the client as to the means by which
[the client’s objectives] are to be pursued.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR.
ASS’N 2018). Decisions about the means are presumptively for the lawyer to make. “Clients normally
defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to
accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters.” Id. at
cmt. 2. The comment does not provide for a resolution if there is an impasse between the lawyer and
client regarding a “means” or tactical decision. It addresses only that the parties should try to work
out an acceptable resolution, and if that is impossible, the lawyer may withdraw. This is most unhelpful.
Where the lawyer has entered an appearance in a litigated matter, the lawyer must obtain the permission
of the court to withdraw. Id. R. 1.16(c). Trial courts will be highly unlikely to grant a motion by trial
counsel to withdraw merely because the lawyer and client are having a hard time agreeing over a matter
of trial strategy. In an interesting twist on the problem, the defendant in State v. Ali made a tactical
decision, over the advice of his lawyers, not to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror. State v.
Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991). The defendant later claimed ineffective assistance of counsel
based on the lawyers’ failure to stop him from making a disastrous tactical decision. Id. at 188. The
court held that “when counsel and a fully informed criminal defendant client reach an absolute impasse
as to such tactical decisions, the client’s wishes must control; this rule is in accord with the principalagent nature of the attorney-client relationship.” Id. at 189. The court in Ali has it exactly backwards.
The lawyer made a mistake by not overriding the client’s ill-considered tactical judgment not to exercise
the peremptory challenge. Perhaps the lawyer anticipated McCoy, and its misinterpretation, by several
decades and believed that the client’s autonomy was the most important value to be served by the
representation. As a matter of professional ethics, however, it is clear that as long as the lawyer
reasonably communicates with the client about tactical decisions, those decisions are within the lawyer’s
authority. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) cmt. 2.
68. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); see also Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385
(1966) (“Where the evidence raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial,
the judge on his own motion must impanel a jury and conduct a sanity hearing pursuant to [state statute
for procedure].” (citing People v. Shrake, 182 N.E.2d 754 (Ill. 1962))).
69. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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competency issues in connection with various stages of the proceedings and
rights given up by the defendant. For example, it is well and good to
recognize the right of self-representation in Faretta, but one might believe
that a higher level of mental competency would be required to actually
perform the functions of a lawyer, as compared with simply communicating
with one’s lawyer and assisting in the defense. But the Court held in Godinez
v. Moran70 that the competency standard to waive counsel and proceed pro
se was not heightened above that level of competency which is required to
stand trial.71 Because the defendant satisfied the standard of competency
to stand trial, and he “‘knowingly and intelligently’ waived[] his right to . . .
counsel, and . . . ‘freely and voluntarily’” pleaded guilty, he was not
permitted to change his guilty pleas.72 Although the Court reasoned in
terms of competency, Godinez also states a principle concerning autonomy,
because competent actors are those whose autonomous decisions must be
respected by others.73 The implication of Godinez would therefore appear
to be that defense counsel must defer to the client’s wishes concerning the
objectives of representation, as long as the client passed the fairly low bar
of competency to stand trial.
The Court subsequently complicated the unified test of Godinez by
recognizing, in Edwards, a new intermediate category of what it called “gray
area” defendants, who pass the low threshold for competency to stand trial
but may not be competent to conduct trial proceedings on their own.74 The
Court distinguished Godinez on the fairly thin ground that the prior case
involved a state court’s decision to permit the defendant to represent himself,
while the present case arose from the defendant’s demand to proceed pro se
and the trial court’s refusal to permit self-representation.75 Again
translating into autonomy terms, Edwards recognized that there is a liminal
area between full autonomy and incompetence, in which the selfrepresentation right of Faretta is inapplicable.76 A defendant may satisfy the
Dusky v. United States77 standard of sufficient ability to work with trial counsel,
70. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
71. See id. at 399.
72. Id. at 393 (citation omitted).
73. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 133, 135.
74. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 172–73 (2008).
75. Id. at 173.
76. See id. at 175 (noting cases decided around the time of Faretta had established a “competency
limitation on the self-representation right” (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813 (1975))).
77. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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yet be unable to serve as counsel.78 The Court referred to empirical research
establishing that competence is a more finely-grained concept than the
unified standard that Godinez recognizes; a defendant may be competent to
stand trial, but be incompetent at performing the tasks necessary for selfrepresentation.79 As that study rightly emphasizes, although it appears to
be an empirical finding, competence is actually a highly contextual
normative judgment, having to do with whether the state ought to seek to
hold the defendant criminally responsible for his actions.80 Because
competence is a normative judgment, it is sensitive to the values that inform
the content of the defendant’s constitutional entitlements. In other words,
it is not a straightforward inference from a finding of competence to stand
trial to the conclusion that it is the defendant’s right to insist on selfrepresentation.
There is, of course, a further required step in the analysis. Edwards deals
with a defendant’s demand to discharge trial counsel and proceed pro se.
McCoy and similar cases involve a defendant who has no wish to exercise the
constitutional right of self-representation, but only to be listened to by his
lawyer (and obeyed). The principle in Edwards, however, is more general
than the specific holding with respect to self-representation. It is curious
that the Court in McCoy did not even mention Edwards, let alone attempt to
distinguish it. The Court notes that the defendant was competent to stand
trial, citing Godinez, without acknowledging the modification to Godinez in
Edwards.81 And in a footnote Justice Ginsburg concedes that on several
occasions McCoy’s lawyer expressed his doubts regarding his
78. See Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175–76.
79. Id.
80. See JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 2
(2002). “[C]ompetence to stand trial—like competence to consent to treatment or to execute a will—
is fundamentally a normative judgment. As applied, such normative judgments inevitably are highly
contextual, depending heavily on the circumstances of the particular case and the impact of the
defendant’s perceived impairments—if any—on the values [of fairness, the accuracy of factual
judgments, the dignity of the criminal process, and the promotion of the defendant’s exercise of selfdetermination].” Id.; see also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 133 (“Even though
[competence] judgments . . . are normative, they are sometimes incorrectly presented as empirical
findings.”).
81. Compare McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) (protecting the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right by stopping counsel from admitting evidence against the defendant’s request), with
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 173 (expounding Godinez’s standard by claiming defendant can stand trial but
cannot represent themselves at trial), and Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 n.14 (1993) (citing the
defendant possessed sufficient present ability to consult counsel).

2018]

Autonomy Isn’t Everything: Some Cautionary Notes on McCoy v. Louisiana

113

competency.82 It seems reasonable to infer that McCoy would qualify as a
gray area defendant under Edwards. A reader is therefore left without
explicit guidance concerning the application of the autonomy interest
recognized by the Court to the representation of gray area defendants.
Although it is not explicit about this, a careful reading of McCoy shows
that autonomy does not displace other objectives that bear on the defense
lawyer’s ethical duties. The Edwards Court says something extremely
important regarding the relationship between standards of competency and
the underlying ethical values that inform the defendant’s rights:
[I]nsofar as a defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction
or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the
most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives, providing a fair
trial. . . . “[T]he government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency
of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own
lawyer[.]”83

Recall that competency is a normative judgment. The Court in Edwards
suggests that autonomy is not a trump card that the defendant can play to
end the normative analysis. All of the institutional actors who comprise the
criminal justice system—defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges—may
properly be influenced by the values of fairness and reliability in
adjudication. The defendant’s autonomy must be given appropriate weight
in the analysis, but it is not decisive.
Defense lawyers must not only be aware of the constitutional principles
applicable to criminal proceedings, but also their obligations under state
rules of professional conduct. The Supreme Court has an unfortunate
tendency to ignore, ridicule, or misunderstand attorney-conduct rules.84
Much as it may sometimes disparage state rules of professional conduct, the
Court does not have the power to relegate them to some kind of lower status
as law. Lawyers are always bound by the rules of professional conduct of
82. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1509 n.3.
83. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176–77 (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152,
162 (2000)).
84. See John H. Blume & W. Bradley Wendel, Coming to Grips with the Ethical Challenges for Capital
Post-Conviction Representation Posed by Martinez v. Ryan, 68 FLA. L. REV. 765, 778–90 (2016) (analyzing
discrepancy between Court’s analysis of lawyers’ duties and the duties recognized by rules of
professional conduct in cases including Mickens v. Taylor, Nix v. Whiteside, Holland v. Florida, and Maples
v. Thompson).
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their admitting state.85 The rules are enforceable through disciplinary
proceedings, but also may play a role in setting the standard of care for tort,
agency, and Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel purposes.
Moreover, the Court in Strickland highlights “the constitutionally protected
independence of counsel” as a reason to defer to the strategic judgments of
defense lawyers.86 If lawyers are to be protected from over-regulation by
courts, a necessary condition is respect for professional conduct rules that
support the self-government of the legal profession.87
The rules of professional conduct reveal profound ambivalence
concerning the representation of what the Edwards Court refers to as “grayarea defendants.”88 Model Rule 1.14(a) takes up the problem of clients
whose “capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection
with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental
impairment or for some other reason[.]”89 The ABA Capital Defense
Guidelines remind lawyers that many of their clients fall into this category:
Many capital defendants are . . . severely impaired in ways that make effective
communication difficult: they may have mental illnesses or personality
disorders that make them highly distrustful or impair their reasoning and
perception of reality; they may be mentally retarded or have other cognitive
impairments that affect their judgment and understanding; they may be
depressed and even suicidal; or they may be in complete denial in the face of
overwhelming evidence. In fact, the prevalence of mental illness and impaired
reasoning is so high in the capital defendant population that “[i]t must be
assumed that the client is emotionally and intellectually impaired.”90

Even if a client did not begin with diminished decision-making capacity, a
lengthy stay on death row while post-conviction proceedings are pending

85. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
86. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (citing United States v. Decoster,
624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶¶ 9, 10.
88. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 173–74.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a).
90. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 4, at 1007 (alteration in original) (quoting Rick Kammen & Lee
Norton, Plea Agreements: Working with Capital Defendants, THE ADVOCATE 31 (Mar. 2000)); see also Russell
Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of Capital Defense Representation,
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 635 (2013) (mentioning the role of the Guidelines in judicial review of the
performance of defense counsel).
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can “play[ ] all kinds of mind games with people.”91 Incapacity can be
episodic and can wax and wane over the course of the proceedings.
With respect to clients with diminished capacity, the only mandatory duty
stated in the Model Rules is to “as far as reasonably possible, maintain a
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.”92 Comments to
Rule 1.14, and to the comparable provision in the Restatement, remind
lawyers that gray-area defendants may retain the capacity to participate to
some extent in the representation.93 Lawyers should therefore explain
matters as reasonably necessary to involve the client in the decision-making
process, particularly since a client may be capable of participating in some
ways while being incapable of participating in others. The mandatory
“shall,” indicating an actual professional obligation as opposed to an
aspiration or best practice, does not appear elsewhere in Rule 1.14.94 The
remaining provisions of the rules are nothing more than aspirational
standards, but provide no concrete guidance to lawyers dealing with a client
who wishes to act in ways that are manifestly against his legal interests.
The duty to maintain a normal relationship as far as possible, and the
recognition that clients with disabilities may retain some capacities to
participate in the representation, in effect creates a gray area within a gray
area. A lawyer must not only assess the client’s overall competence, under
Godinez and Edwards, but must be prepared to make more granular
determinations of the client’s competence with respect to a particular issue.
Making things more difficult for lawyers, the Restatement warns against
91. Harrington, supra note 53, at 866 (quoting a capital defense attorney). Another lawyer
reports:
People on death row are not in an ideal position for making tough emotional, moral decisions. A
lot of them are cognitively limited. . . . Many of them are brain damaged. Some of them are
mentally ill. . . . Then you add to that the fact that they’re living in an environment where they
don’t get sufficient rest, they’re not well fed, their health isn’t well taken care of and they’re treated
like animals. . . . None of those people are in a position to make a reasoned, difficult decision of
the magnitude of “I am going to give up my life.”
Id. at 867 n. 24 (quoting attorney #6).
92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a).
93. See id. at cmt. 1 (“[A] client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand,
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client’s own well-being.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2001)
(“Clients should not be unnecessarily deprived of their right to control their own affairs on accounts
of such disabilities.”).
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b), (c).
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inferring lack of competence from the client’s desire to pursue a foolish
course of action:
Lawyers . . . should be careful not to construe as proof of disability a client’s
insistence on a view of the client’s welfare that a lawyer considers unwise or
otherwise at variance with the lawyer’s own views.
....
. . . A lawyer should act only on a reasonable belief, based on appropriate
investigation, that the client is unable to make an adequately considered
decision rather than simply being confused or misguided.95

A lawyer may obtain an independent evaluation of the client’s competency,
and in fact may wish to raise competency issues with the court. If an
evaluation concludes that the client is competent for some purposes and not
for others—i.e., is within the Edwards gray area—the lawyer still has to
somehow determine the right balance between having a normal lawyerclient relationship (which includes deferring to the client’s instructions) and
taking some sort of protective action. Rule 1.14(b) permits the lawyer to
take other protective action, including consulting with medical professionals
and seeking the appointment of a guardian, but does not require the lawyer
to do anything.96 It is very uncommon to see a guardian appointed to make
decisions on behalf of a criminal defendant with respect to the defendant’s
legal rights. It is generally up to the lawyer and client to make these
decisions. If the client lacks the capacity to make adequately considered
decisions but insists on directing the lawyer to do something that would be
a catastrophe at trial, the guidance of Rule 1.14 runs out.
The Restatement arguably handles this situation in a far more satisfactory
manner, although it appears to be in tension with McCoy. First, comments
to section 24 frankly admit that a lawyer must sometimes choose among
imperfect alternatives.97 It runs through the same steps as Rule 1.14, first
reminding the lawyer to try to maintain a normal lawyer-client relationship
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmts. c, d.
96. See MODEL RULES of PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) cmts. 5–7 (“Such measures could
include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or
improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decisionmaking tools such as durable powers
of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other
individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client.”).
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. b.
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if possible,98 suggesting the possibility of protective action such as a
guardian,99 and requiring the lawyer to accept direction from the guardian
It then departs radically—and
if one has been appointed.100
controversially101—from the Model Rules by explicitly giving the lawyer
permission to “pursue the lawyer’s reasonable view of the client’s objectives
or interests as the client would define them if able to make adequately considered
decisions on the matter, even if the client expresses no wishes or gives
contrary instructions.”102 The italicized language is important. The
Restatement does not license wide-open paternalism by lawyers, allowing
them to substitute their own judgment for that of their clients. The client’s
autonomy is still protected by the requirement that the lawyer act on the
client’s own determination of what is in his or her best interests.103
98. See id. § 24(1) (“[T]he lawyer must, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal clientlawyer relationship with the client and act in the best interests of the client as stated in Subsection (2).”);
accord MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (“[T]he lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.”).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(4) (“A lawyer
representing a client with diminished capacity as described in Subsection (1) may seek the appointment
of a guardian[.]”); accord MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (“When the lawyer reasonably
believes that the client has diminished capacity, . . . the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective
action, including . . . in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator
or guardian.”).
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(3) (“[T]he client’s
lawyer must treat that person as entitled to act with respect to the client’s interests in the matter[.]”);
accord MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4 (“If a legal representative has already been
appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf
of the client.”).
101. Cf. Colo. Bar Ass’n, Formal Ethics Op. 126 (May 6, 2015) (“The duty to maintain a normal
client–lawyer relationship precludes a lawyer from acting solely as an arm of the court, using the
lawyer’s assessment of the ‘best interests’ of the client to justify waiving the client’s rights without
consultation, divulging the client’s confidences, disregarding the client’s wishes, or presenting evidence
against the client.”).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(2) (emphasis added).
Comments to Model Rule 1.14 do lean slightly in the direction of the Restatement approach, even if
the black-letter text of Rule 1.14 does not go as far as Restatement § 24. Comment (d) states that, in
determining the extent of a client’s diminished capacity, a lawyer should consider, among other factors,
the consistency of a decision with the known “long-term commitments” and values of the client.
Compare id. at cmt. d., with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 6. This consideration
suggests a split between the client’s preferences and interests, and that a lawyer may be justified in
acting on the latter.
103. In theoretical terms, the lawyer acts not on the client’s interests, but on the client’s
presumptive will—that which the client would choose if not incompetent. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM
TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 322 (1986). Somewhat confusingly, this
standard is referred to in bioethics as the “substituted judgment” standard. BEAUCHAMP &
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However, the Restatement does permit the lawyer to override the client’s
expression of a contrary view if the lawyer reasonably believes the client
lacks the capacity to make adequately considered decisions.104 It
contemplates cases like Florida v. Nixon,105 in which the client says nothing
in response to the lawyer’s efforts to communicate about trial strategy, but
it goes beyond that narrow situation to permit the lawyer to ignore contrary
instructions from an impaired client if the lawyer believes the client would
express a different preference if not residing in the Edwards gray zone.106
Doing so vindicates the lawyer’s obligation to ensure the fairness of the
proceedings against the defendant.
The Restatement also represents an instance of so-called “soft”
paternalism. The following section shows that not all interventions by
professionals are an objectionable interference with the client’s autonomy,
properly understood. Soft paternalism involves acting on the genuine
preferences of another, as compared with those expressed preferences that
result from lack of information, disability, delusion, or some other
interference with the capacity to make fully autonomous choices. The
principle stated in McCoy must be understood as modified by the duty of
lawyers representing gray zone defendants to protect the interests of their
clients, notwithstanding their clients’ objections.
III. AUTONOMY AND ANTI-PATERNALISM IN THEORY
Professionals, including physicians and lawyers, have considerable power
over their patients or clients.107 Professionals have specialized knowledge
and expertise which is opaque to non-professionals who have not
undergone extensive training and socialization.108 Their patients or clients
CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 171. The substitution is not of the agent’s conception of the principal’s
best interests, however, but of the principal’s judgment for that of the agent. The risk of the substituted
judgment standard is that, in the absence of probative evidence of what the client (or patient) would
actually have wanted, the professional has no alternative but to fall back on considerations of what a
hypothetical reasonable person would do under the circumstances. Id. at 172. This can invite a
substitution of the professional’s own conception of a wise decision for that of the client or patient.
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. d.
105. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
106. Id. at 177; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. d.
107. See, e.g., TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD
CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 93 (2009).
108. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (“A lawyer’s
work is sometimes complex and technical, often is performed in the client’s absence, and often cannot
properly be evaluated simply by observing the results. Special safeguards are therefore necessary.”).
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consult them in matters that pertain to important matters connected to their
health or legal rights. The relationship is often a one-off engagement or
consultation, so there is little opportunity to develop trust through repeated
interaction and observation. Patients or clients are therefore in a position
of vulnerability, dependent for their well-being upon the professional’s
compliance with stringent standards of ethics.
One of the great themes in professional ethics in the second half of the
twentieth century is the assault on the paternalism inherent in the imbalance
of power between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients.109 Paternalism
means acting on behalf of another in such a way that overrides the other’s
rights or freedoms for the sake of their own good.110 Physicians
traditionally were permitted to make their own judgments about their
patients’ needs for treatment or information; the ethical justification for
overriding their patients’ expressed wishes was not only the impossibility of
most patients appreciating the issues and tradeoffs involved in making these
judgments, but also the primacy of the Hippocratic duty to improve the
health of the patient.111 The physician’s primary obligation qua physician
was to act for the patient’s medical benefit, and since the physician was in
an authoritative position, to determine the patient’s best interests.112 The
pushback against physician paternalism, both in law (primarily tort
principles of medical malpractice) and philosophy, went under the banner
of informed consent.
Informed consent rules require a physician to provide sufficient
information and obtain the patient’s consent before performing treatment.
Early cases raising informed consent were actually pled as claims for battery.
The idea was that the patient’s consent was a defense to what would
otherwise be a battery by the surgeon—a harmful contact with the patient’s
body—but if the surgeon exceeded the scope of consent, the contact would
be actionable as a battery.113 The wrong is not that the doctor made a
109. See O’NEILL, supra note 48, at 18 (“[T]here was one point of agreement about necessary
change in the early years of contemporary medical ethics, it was that this traditional, paternalistic
conception of the doctor-patient relationship was defective . . . .”); see generally PAUL STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
110. ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 161
(1980).
111. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 272.
112. Id. at 274.
113. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“[A] surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
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mistake in the course of performing a procedure, but that the doctor did
something the patient had not expressly given permission to do. As the
doctrine of informed consent evolved, courts had to consider the issue of
how much information a patient was entitled to, and whether the adequacy
of the required disclosure should be evaluated from the perspective of the
physician or the patient.114 As the law continued to develop, and
particularly as some courts detached the standard for assessing the adequacy
of disclosure from prevailing custom in the medical community,115 it
became clear that the law was recognizing a separate interest, over and above
the patient’s interest in receiving competent medical treatment. That
interest is patient autonomy. Autonomy as protected by informed-consent
doctrines is not reducible to the interest of patients in quality medical care,
and it may in fact require a physician to refrain from doing something that
would be best for the patient’s health.116 Respect for autonomy requires
respecting the self-determining choices of other rational agents.117
Informed consent therefore serves a function beyond protecting a patient
from harm—namely, protecting autonomous choice.118

damages.” (citing Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905))),
rev’d on other grounds, Bing v. Thuning, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957); see also Kennedy v. Parrott, 90 S.E.2d
754, 758 (N.C. 1956) (“Hence the courts formulated the rule that any extension of the operation by
the physician without the consent of the patient . . . constituted a battery . . . .”).
114. See Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 187 (Minn. 1956) (“The sole issue
raised by the plaintiff on appeal is: Should the question of whether or not there was an assault or
unauthorized operation have been submitted to the jury as a fact issue?”); see also Largey v. Rothman,
540 A.2d 504, 504 (N.J. 1988) (per curiam) (“The single question presented goes to the correctness of
the standard by which the jury was instructed to determine whether the defendant, Dr. Rothman, had
adequately informed his patient of the risks of that operation.”); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556
(Okla. 1980) (“The issue involved is whether Oklahoma adheres to the doctrine of informed consent
as the basis of an action for medical malpractice, and if so did the present instructions adequately advise
the jury of defendant’s duty.”).
115. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The scope of the
standard is not subjective as to either the physician or the patient; it remains objective with due regard
for the patient’s informational needs and with suitable leeway for the physician’s situation.”).
116. See Norman Daniels, Understanding Physician Power: A Review of the Social Transformation of
American Medicine, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 347, 347 (1984) (“The philosophical task has been to show
that the importance of the good which competent medical care delivers does not justify ignoring patient
autonomy or rights.”).
117. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 125 (“To respect an autonomous agent
is, at a minimum, to acknowledge that person’s right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions
based on personal values and beliefs.”).
118. Id. at 142–43.
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The theoretical question is what justifies preferring the duty to respect
the patient’s autonomy over the duty to act for the benefit of others (often
referred to in modern bioethics as the principle of beneficence).119
Addressing this question requires consideration of the grounds for the
principle of respect for autonomy. Understood merely as choice, autonomy
seems to be an empty value. The mere fact that something was freely chosen
does not confer value upon it, without a connection to some deeper set of
reasons that explain why the agent made the choice she did.120
Nevertheless, it is a strongly-held intuition that autonomy in general is a
positive moral good. The most persuasive general accounts of the value of
autonomy begin with a first-personal perspective on ourselves as selforiginating sources of value.121 On this essentially Kantian conception of
human dignity, each person has a practical identity—“a description under
which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be
worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.”122 Dignity flows
from the reflective self-consciousness that consists in having reasons to act
and to live—in less theoretical terms, having a one’s own story to tell.123 A
moral agent is one who has the “capacity to recognize, assess, and be moved
by reasons.”124 The value of human dignity requires that people be given
an opportunity to endorse or reject the reasons for treating them in a
119. See ENGELHARDT, supra note 48, at 284 (“The central moral difficulty lies in the problem
of establishing the priority of duties of beneficence over duties of autonomy.”).
120. See O’NEILL, supra note 48, at 28 (“Individual autonomy is not a matter of mere, sheer
independence, of the sort praised by pop-existentialists . . . . Whatever else people think about
individual or personal autonomy, they do not equate it with mere choice.”).
121. See DAVID LUBAN, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting
It), in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 71 (2007) (“Intuitively, it seems plain that, elusive or not,
our own subjectivity lies at the very core of our concern for human dignity. To deny my subjectivity
is to deny my human dignity.”).
122. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 101 (Onora O’Neill ed.
1996) [hereinafter KORSGAARD, NORMATIVITY]. I use the weasel words “essentially Kantian” here
advisedly, in order to foreground the idea of humans as self-originating sources of value without fully
endorsing Kant’s account of autonomy as pure practical reason, unconnected with any objects of
inclination—i.e., ends that are already given. Kantian autonomy is not concerned so much with free
will as with rational will. See FEINBERG, supra note 103, at 36 (discussing John Rawls’s interpretation
of Immanuel Kant); CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, An Introduction to the Ethical, Political, and Religious
Thought of Kant, in CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 3, 22–24 (1996); JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON
THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 226–30 (Barbara Herman ed. 2000); J.B. SCHNEEWIND,
Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 248 (2010).
123. KORSGAARD, NORMATIVITY, supra note 122, at 120–21; LUBAN, supra note 121, at 70.
124. T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 23 (1998).
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particular way.125 Because of the centrality of practical identity to moral
agency, each of us may justifiably demand that we be treated only in ways
that we can accept. Autonomy means not being “subject[] to the will of
another.”126 Therefore, one wrongs another by acting against that person’s
formed judgments and preferences, even if the act is supposedly meant to
benefit that person.127 The wrong involved in disrespecting another’s
autonomy is a violation of the other’s personhood, understood as the right
to determine for oneself what to do.128
David Luban has written movingly in opposition to lawyers who “ride
roughshod over the commitments that make the client’s life meaningful and
so impart dignity to it.”129 Ted Kaczynski, for example, the Unabomber
who committed several murders and attempted murders in pursuit of his
utopian fantasy of a world without technology, had an autonomy and dignity
based interest in not being portrayed by his lawyers as mentally ill.130 By
presenting him to the fact-finder as crazy, and thus not deserving of the
death penalty, his defense lawyers “made nonsense of his deepest
commitments, of what mattered to him and made him who he was.”131 It
must be said, however, that Luban’s argument tacitly depends on
Kaczynski’s competency. If he were seriously mentally ill, but nevertheless
smart enough to fool the state’s examiner into concluding he was
competent, his lawyers would be justified in acting on what they reasonably
125. Id. at 169. Note the difference between this conception of dignity and the Court’s concern
in Edwards that allowing a mentally ill defendant to proceed pro se could result in a spectacle that “is at
least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). The
Kantian notion of dignity discussed here should not be confused with the Court’s concern for whether
the trial is conducted in a dignified manner.
126. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 155 (1986).
127. Id. at 151.
128. FEINBERG, supra note 103, at 27.
129. LUBAN, supra note 121, at 76.
130. See generally MICHAEL MELLO, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VERSUS THEODORE
JOHN KACZYNSKI: ETHICS, POWER AND THE INVENTION OF THE UNABOMBER (1999) (defending
Kaczynski’s interest, based on his autonomy, in defending his case in a manner that increased his
likelihood of being sentenced to death).
131. LUBAN, supra note 121, at 79. Luban argues that Kaczynski’s lawyers violated his dignity
but not his autonomy, but the account of autonomy I am developing here is close to Luban’s
conception of human dignity. Nothing in the overall argument of this paper turns on whether the
relevant value motivating anti-paternalist conduct by lawyers is best described as the dignity or
autonomy of clients. Because the majority in McCoy talks in terms of autonomy, and due to the Edwards
Court’s confusion between human dignity and an undignified spectacle, noted supra note 74, I will also
analyze the ethical issues in terms of the defendant’s autonomy interest, not dignity.
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believed would be his own interests if he were competent to define them.
Ultimately this is a mixed empirical and normative question. Luban’s
argument is normatively attractive, but only in the case of a competent
defendant.
Joseph Raz, who has contributed considerable insight about autonomy to
moral and political philosophy, cautions against seeing it as the only, or the
most important, thing of value to persons:
[T]hough coercion often, even usually, adversely affects people’s well-being it
does not deserve the special importance attributed to it in much of liberal
political thought unless one holds personal autonomy to be of very great
value. But even if one does it is easy to exaggerate the evils of coercion, in
comparison with other evils or misfortunes which may fall to people in their
life.132

It is widely accepted that some interventions against a person’s expressed
desires may be justified by the person’s own good. Ignorance, for example,
may permit others to intervene in pursuit of a person’s fully-informed selfinterest. Mill’s famous example, in On Liberty, shows that one may seize a
person and prevent him from crossing a bridge he does not realize is unsafe;
“liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall
into the river.”133 This is a clear case of justified paternalism (sometimes
called “weak” or “soft” paternalism), because there is no ambiguity
concerning the other’s long-range preferences and views about his own

132. RAZ, supra note 126, at 156. Note an interesting and subtle framing of this issue in terms
of the burden of proof. Raz asks, in this passage, why autonomy deserves special importance and
whether it has very great value. Raz’s view is close to that of Beauchamp and Childress, who contend
that autonomy “has only prima facie standing and can be overridden by competing moral
considerations.” BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 126 (emphasis added). “The most
plausible justification of paternalism views benefit as resting on a scale with autonomy interests, where
both must be balanced . . . .” Id. at 281. They caution that an excessive emphasis on autonomy may
displace or distort other moral values. Id. at 128. Engelhardt differs from Raz and Beauchamp and
Childress in the allocation of the burden of proof, contending that “[t]he central moral difficulty lies
in the problem of establishing the priority of duties of beneficence over duties of autonomy.”
ENGELHARDT, supra note 48, at 284. While he does not deny that the principle of respect for
autonomy can be overridden, on his view the burden is higher for one who would intervene against
another’s expressed preferences.
133. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 96 (Stefan Collini
ed. 1989) (1859).
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good that are served by the intervention.134 The intervention is not
motivated by concerns with the wisdom or prudence of the choice, but by
doubts that the choice is genuine. A much more difficult case—“strong”
or “hard” paternalism—involves an intervention aimed at benefitting a
person, notwithstanding the informed and voluntary nature of the other’s
choice.135 Following McCoy, defense lawyers seeking to protect their clients
from making choices that will lead to almost-certain conviction, and
possibly also a death sentence, would do best by relying on strategies of soft
paternalism.
An important insight from the bioethics literature is that competency is
closely related to the justification of paternalism. Engelhardt writes: “[o]ne
should note that requiring greater certainty of competence when an
individual’s choices are likely to be dangerous is a form of weak
paternalism.”136 Weak paternalism, to emphasize, is arguably not
paternalism at all, because it is justified by an assessment of the other’s true
interests, if he or she were able to define and act on them.137 It respects
autonomy by relying on the other’s hypothetical consent. This is the form
of paternalism recognized in the Restatement provision on representing
clients with diminished capacity.138 On a sliding-scale approach to
competency, the greater the risk for a patient, the higher the level of ability
that will be required before the patient is deemed competent to elect or
refuse the intervention.139 By analogy, the more important the client
134. FEINBERG, supra note 103, at 98–100; GOLDMAN, supra note 110, at 162 . It should also
be clear that explicit fiduciary entrustment of one’s interests to the judgment of another does not
represent morally objectionable paternalism. Engelhardt’s examples of joining a package tour, trusting
the tour guide to select worthwhile place to see, and a patient telling a physician, “You decide what . . .
is the best form of treatment,” do not involve interference with autonomy. ENGELHARDT, supra
note 48, at 279–81.
135. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 277. Requiring drivers to wear seatbelts or
motorcycle riders to wear helmets is a familiar example of hard legal paternalism. See FEINBERG,
supra note 103, at 134–42. The law also prohibits numerous transactions or relationships between
parties that both parties (presumably autonomously) consent to, including assisted suicide, gambling,
prize-fighting, duels, bigamy, and prostitution. Id. at 172.
136. ENGELHARDT, supra note 48, at 283; see also FEINBERG, supra note 103, at 118.
137. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 277–78, 281; FEINBERG, supra note 103,
at 14.
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(2) (AM. LAW INST.
2001) (stating a lawyer must “pursue the lawyer’s reasonable view of the client’s objectives or interests
as the client would define them if able to make adequately considered decisions”).
139. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 138. The irrevocability of the harm is also a
consideration to be taken into account by the sliding-scale model. See FEINBERG, supra note 103,
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interests at stake, the more a lawyer may have to require by way of client
competency before following a client’s instructions to do something
foolhardy. This may appear to involve a conceptual confusion, as
competency refers to a capacity to do something, which is unrelated to the
risk of that activity.140 No confusion is involved, however, if the slidingscale approach is understood as relating to the decision whether to override
another’s expressed preferences, not an empirical assessment of
competency.141 The principle articulated in McCoy is a preference for
autonomy, but it must be qualified by the obligation of defense counsel and
the legal system generally to ensure that a client’s decisions are the product
of a rational, deliberative process. Where they are not, the lawyer may act
instead on the client’s interests if he or she were able to act on them.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE RESTATEMENT’S WEAK
PATERNALISM PRINCIPLE
Articles about competency and the autonomy interests of clients are full
of accounts by experienced criminal defense lawyers of representing
delusional clients; in many of these stories, the clients were deemed
competent to stand trial under Godinez and the hard question for the lawyer
was whether to follow the client’s instructions.142 As the Court observed
in Edwards, “Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree.
It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual’s functioning at
different times in different ways.”143 The “gray area” category was created
to recognize the unworkability of the one-size-fits-all standard of Godinez
when measuring the defendant’s ability to conduct his own defense. The

at 120. Obviously a capital case involves the irrevocable harm of being killed by the state, which weighs
heavily in favor of permitting a lawyer to intervene to protect the client’s true interests.
140. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 140–41.
141. Id. at 141.
142. See John H. Blume & Morgan J. Clark, “Unwell”: Indiana v. Edwards and the Fate of Mentally
Ill Pro Se Defendants, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 151–53 (2011) (recounting representation of
client who believed she was God’s daughter called to lead God’s army against evil demons and believed
her murdered husband was engaged in occult practices and devil worship); Garnett, supra note 30,
at 802 (describing defendant who believed man-elf “Fro” had been reincarnated on earth as
defendant’s murdered girlfriend and that he would rejoin Fro on the planet Terracia after his
execution); Hawkinson, supra note 32, at 465 (reporting pro se representation by capital defendant who
dressed in a purple cowboy suit and tried to subpoena Jesus, the Pope, and JFK).
143. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175 (2008).
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trouble, of course, is that an amorphous standard is difficult to apply.144
The trial court may have to apply it when a defendant insists on proceeding
pro se. The Court in both McCoy and Edwards seems to fail to appreciate,
however, that the standard must also be applied by defense lawyers, without
assistance of the court, throughout the course of the representation. The
defendant’s invocation of the Faretta self-representation right is a singular
moment during which the attention of both sides, and the trial court, are
concentrated on making a determination of the defendant’s competency to
conduct trial proceedings. Preliminary empirical evidence suggests that trial
courts are taking a fairly hands-off attitude to the determination of
competency to self-represent, even where defendants have been diagnosed
with severe mental illness.145 Since trial courts are not protecting gray area
defendants from making disastrous decisions, a defense lawyer may feel
isolated, as the only institutional actor looking out for the defendant’s best
interests. In addition, defendants ask things of their lawyers that do not
bring the proceedings to a halt while a critical issue is determined. Defense
lawyers have to decide, on the fly, whether to accept instructions from a
client whose competency they seriously question, or to take a different
action to protect the client’s interests.
In light of the silence of the Model Rules regarding how to proceed with
the representation of a gray area defendant, lawyers may fall back on their
assumptions concerning the ethical theory that lies in the background of
their more specific professional obligations. The widespread view that
autonomy is the paramount value in professional ethics may cause lawyers
to go through the following simplistic analysis: the lawyer’s role is to protect
the client’s rights; one of the client’s rights is to make autonomous decisions;
interfering with the client’s decision-making is a violation of the principle of
autonomy; therefore, the lawyer acts against the client’s rights, and acts
wrongly, by not accepting the client’s instructions to take an action that will
be contrary to the client’s interests.146 The most important message of this

144. See Harrington, supra note 53, at 853 (observing the competency standard is highly
contextual, depending on the nature of the decisions that must be made at various stages of the
proceedings).
145. Blume & Clark, supra note 142, at 164–65.
146. Tremblay, supra note 51, at 557. It is noteworthy that Tremblay’s 1987 article, and his
belief that lawyers are lacking ethical guidance, are still relevant, even though written before Godinez,
Edwards, and McCoy. In other words, the Supreme Court isn’t helping defense counsel figure out what
to do in these extremely difficult cases.
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Article to lawyers going through this simple ethical analysis would be, “hold
on—not so fast.”
First, autonomy is not the only value that bears on the ethical obligations
of defense counsel. McCoy shows that it is weighty, but it is not absolute.
Second, the valorization of autonomy and the centrality of informed
consent in professional ethics presupposes a fully competent, rational client.
Where there are departures from this ideal, the ethical analysis will
necessarily be different. The sliding-scale approach to competency ensures
that interferences with client autonomy will be minimized if relatively
inconsequential client interests are at stake. Only in cases like McCoy, where
the client’s interest is in avoiding the death penalty, will lawyers be permitted
to override the decisions of “gray area” defendants. Third, the client’s rights
at trial are those provided by the law’s framework of substantive and
procedural rights. The client does not have all the rights he wants to have—
only those provided for by law. To take a simple example, a client may wish
to represent herself on appeal, but she does not have that right.147 Finally,
a lawyer does not interfere with the client’s autonomy when making
decisions based on the client’s interests or objectives as the client would
define them if capable of making adequately informed decisions.148
Lawyers must be careful to ascertain what their client’s interests actually are,
and not merely assume that they are as the lawyer would define them. In
principle, however, a lawyer does not engage in impermissible paternalism
by acting on an incompetent client’s fully-informed interests that the client’s
incapacity makes difficult to express.
Although the Model Rules are not particularly helpful, the Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers supports this model of weak paternalism. It
also offers several caveats that will be helpful to lawyers when deciding how
to act when representing a client in the Edwards gray area of competency. (I
will add a couple of my own).

147. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) (“Considering the change
in position from defendant to appellant, the autonomy interests that survive a felony conviction are
less compelling than those motivating the decision in Faretta. Yet the overriding state interest in the
fair and efficient administration of justice remains as strong as at the trial level. Thus, the States are
clearly within their discretion to conclude that the government’s interests outweigh an invasion of the
appellant’s interest in self-representation.”).
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(2) (AM. LAW INST.
2001) (explaining that when a client has diminished capacity, a lawyer may step in and make decisions
for his client, without the client having to instruct the lawyer to do so).
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1. A lawyer should ensure that a client in fact lacks the capacity to make
adequately considered decisions and should not “construe as proof of
disability a client’s insistence on a view of the client’s welfare that a lawyer
considers unwise or otherwise at variance with the lawyer’s own views.”149
A client in a grip of a “flamboyant[,] talking-to-spaceships”150 delusion is
an easy case. Much more difficult is a case like the representation of Ted
Kaczynski, the Unabomber—“a coldly methodical killer who . . . destroyed
human lives with clinical detachment[,]”151 and did so in furtherance of a
goal to resist the technology he believed was destroying the world.152 His
neighbor in Montana stated that he sent bombs through the mail for reasons
of hatred and revenge,153 which are rational, if not admirable motivations.
Kaczynski can be understood as radical, but not crazy—a serious,
compelling, but extremely dangerous person.154
The lawyers representing Kaczynski did obtain independent psychiatric
evaluations, which concluded he was suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia,155 so they should not be criticized for jumping to an
unfounded conclusion that their client lacked sufficient decision-making
capacity. But it is certainly possible to imagine someone (Michael Mello’s
example is John Brown) who commits acts of violence out of a sense of
duty and is not mentally ill.156 Lacking specific evidence of what a client
would have preferred if not incapacitated, a lawyer may rely on assumptions
about what a reasonable person would do in the same circumstances.157
Like any application of an objective reasonable-person standard, this
process can be dismissive of idiosyncratic preferences because it is sensitive
to the community’s expectations. As O.W. Holmes famously observed, “a
man [who] is born hasty and awkward” is still troublesome to his neighbors,
who will force him “at his proper peril, to come up to their standard[.]”158
149. Id. at cmt. c.
150. Garnett, supra note 30, at 803.
151. MELLO, supra note 130, at 28.
152. Id. at 30.
153. Id. at 35–36.
154. Id. at 41–42.
155. Id. at 32–33. See the Restatement comment instructing lawyers that “[w]here practicable
and reasonably available, independent professional evaluation of the client’s capacity may be sought.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. d. (AM. LAW INST. 2001). As
noted above, it may be that Kaczynski was simply smart enough to fool the examiner.
156. MELLO, supra note 130, at 157–63.
157. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 172.
158. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., 1982) (1881).
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Even on the assumption that John Brown was more like a prophet than a
psychopath, it is unlikely that the community whose standards inform the
construction of the hypothetical reasonable person would be able to endorse
fully the idea of becoming a martyr for the abolitionist cause. It may be that
mental illness is hard to diagnose in prophetic social critics who indict the
entire society and its norms,159 and it is hard to generalize to the ethics of
ordinary cases from the representation of an extraordinary character like
Ted Kaczynski or John Brown. As long as lawyers use the sliding-scale
approach and consider overriding their client’s instructions only where the
client interests at stake are significant, the Restatement approach should not
result in widespread paternalism by lawyers.
2. The Restatement warns lawyers not to stray from their usual role as
advocate.160 The line between weak and strong paternalism is crossed when
a lawyer is no longer seeking to promote the client’s interests, as the client
would define them if able to make adequately considered decisions,161 but
is instead making a judgment about what is in the client’s interests. Here is
an example from David Luban’s article on paternalism in the legal
profession:
You are the court-appointed attorney representing the interests of a thirteenyear-old boy in a custody case. You must make a report to the court about
who should get custody; such reports usually have a major impact on what is
decided. Your client, an inarticulate and unhappy-looking boy in a faded
jean[ ] jacket, is sullen and suspicious. He says he would rather live with his
father, but falls silent when you try to find out why. The father is a gladhanding, sporadically employed alcoholic; the mother is a hard-working
disciplinarian who lives with her mother in a tidy row-house. Both women
appear concerned for your client’s welfare. In your opinion, the boy prefers
his father because his father lets him get away with more; the social worker
on the case tells you that the boy is part of a drinking and doping crowd.162

159. MELLO, supra note 130, at 159.
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. c. (“The lawyer
should adhere, to the extent reasonably possible, to the lawyer’s usual function as advocate and agent
of the client, not judge or guardian, unless the lawyer’s role in the situation is modified by other law.”).
161. Id. § 24(2) (“A lawyer representing a client with diminished capacity . . . [must] pursue the
lawyer’s reasonable view of the client’s objectives or interests as the client would define them if able to
make adequately considered decisions on the matter, even if the client expresses no wishes or gives
contrary instructions.”).
162. Luban, supra note 24, at 455.
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Luban’s hypothetical puts the attorney in the role of a guardian ad litem,
called upon to make a determination of what is in fact in the thirteen-yearold’s best interests and report that conclusion to a decisionmaker. Imagine
instead that the attorney was asked to represent the child, as an advocate.
(New York has this procedure,163 and other states may as well.) The
attorney’s role would then be to act upon the child’s instructions—assuming
he was otherwise competent—to pursue the alternative of living with his
father.164 It would then be for the decisionmaker to consider the lawyer’s
argument, along with the positions of the other parties, and make the bestinterests determination. Luban cleverly embeds some ambiguity in the
hypothetical with the fact that the child is silent on why he wants to live with
his father. The attorney should certainly attempt to find out what is behind
the child’s request, but even if it is nothing more than finding his father
more enjoyable to be around than his mother, the attorney’s role is to
advocate for the child’s position, not a view about what is in his best
interests.
Lawyers sometimes resist the characterization as “officer[s] of the
court[,]”165 fearing that it may compromise the single-minded loyalty and
zealous advocacy they rightly believe they owe to their clients, particularly
in criminal defense representation. But there is a difference between
zealously representing clients and zealously representing client interests. Plenty
of loose dicta in McCoy, some citing to Faretta, valorizes the defendant as the
object of the lawyer’s duties. Individual choices, Justice Ginsburg writes,
“must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law.’”166 Properly understood, however, the defense
163. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 2018) (“This act declares that minors who are
the subject of family court proceedings or appeals in proceedings originating in the family court should
be represented by counsel of their own choosing or by assigned counsel.”).
164. “If the child is capable of knowing, voluntary and considered judgment, the attorney for
the child should be directed by the wishes of the child, even if the attorney for the child believes that
what the child wants is not in the child’s best interests.” N.Y. CT. RULES § 7.2(d)(2) (McKinney 2018)
(“Function of the Attorney for the Child”).
165. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947) (“Historically, a lawyer is an officer
of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful
interests of his clients.”).
166. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1507 (2018) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834 (1975)). The Court also cites Erica Hashimoto’s article on the value of autonomy. See id.
at 1508 (citing Hashimoto, supra note 26, at 1178). Commentary on McCoy notes the reliance by both
amici and the majority opinion on the Hashimoto article; an article in Slate, for example, states that
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion “is essentially a vindication of Resurrecting Autonomy’s central thesis,
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lawyer’s duty is to pursue the lawful objectives of the client, as the client
The “officer of the court”
defines them after consultation.167
characterization can be understood as the prerogative of lawyers to exercise
their professional expertise and judgment to best protect the client’s

writing its arguments into constitutional law.” Mark Joseph Stern, Justice Ginsburg’s Groundbreaking
Opinion in McCoy Revives Criminal Defendants’ Right to Autonomy, SLATE (May 15, 2018, 7:43 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/justice-ginsburgs-opinion-in-mccoy-v-louisianarevives-criminal-defendants-right-to-autonomy.html [http://perma.cc/3NSX-RCA2]. If this article is
really to be seen as part of constitutional law, however, a few caveats are in order. Hashimoto says the
Edwards problem is a special problem that affects only a small minority, and so the concern for mentally
ill defendants does not justify abandoning the autonomy interest of fully competent defendants. See
Hashimoto, supra note 26, at 1151 (“Sacrificing the autonomy interest of all defendants in order to deal
with special problems that affect only a small minority makes no sense.”). McCoy is not a marginal
problem for the capital defense community. She refers to the concern for “abuse” of the autonomy
interest by mentally ill clients. See id. at 1184 (“The final argument against recognizing an autonomy
interest arises from a concern that mentally ill defendants will use the autonomy interest to hurt their
own interests.”). However, the issue is not abuse, but rather the failure of a basic assumption upon
which the deference to autonomy is based. The word “abuse” suggests that the client may be acting
in subjective bad faith, but an incompetent client may very well believe—wrongly—that the best
defense would be to assert an elaborate conspiracy involving all of the judges, political officials, and
police offers in the state. A lawyer is not asserting reliability and fairness issues as against the client’s
well-considered views about what is in his best interests; instead, the lawyer is protecting a client who
is unable to form well-considered views. Finally, Hashimoto suggests that the standard for competency
to stand trial may need to be lowered to protect questionably competent defendants. See id. at 1186
(“This fact results from the exceedingly high standard for establishing incompetence to stand trial.”).
The standard for competency to participate meaningfully in the representation has, in Edwards, already
been lowered as compared with the Godinez standard of competency to stand trial. And as a matter of
the law governing lawyers, the Model Rules and the Restatement recognize a standard of meaningful
participation in the lawyer-client decision-making process, which in principle is independent of
standards of competency for various procedural purposes. Thus, her article does not speak to the hard
question concerning the proper balance between autonomy and other constitutionally protected values
in the representation of gray area clients (Edwards) or clients with diminished decision-making capacity
(Model Rules and Restatement).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (AM. LAW INST.
2001) (“[A] lawyer must, in matters within the scope of the representation . . . proceed in a manner
reasonably calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives, as defined by the client after
consultation[.]”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“[A] lawyer
shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by
Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.”) For a political
and jurisprudential argument for this way of understanding the ethical obligations of lawyers, see W.
BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010) (furthering the political and
jurisprudential argument of a lawyer’s ethical obligations).
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interests.168 As noted above,169 professionals serve their clients in areas in
which non-professionals lack the expertise to know how to proceed in their
best interests. Just as the Hippocratic principle prohibits physicians from
taking actions that harm the health of their patients,170 an analogous duty
for lawyers might be understood as refusing to represent a client in a manner
that will inevitably lead to the deprivation of the client’s rights, which in a
capital case include the client’s right to life. The law may protect the
individual, but lawyers still have a duty to promote the best interests of their
clients.
In the course of supporting the lawyer’s role as advocate for the client,
Justice Ginsburg attacks a straw person. The Louisiana Supreme Court had
stated that the defense lawyer’s concession of his client’s guilt might be
necessitated by Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits assisting a client in conduct the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.171 However, the lawyer did not
know that McCoy intended to testify falsely, so the relevant crime could not
be perjury.172 As long as client perjury is not involved,173 no sensible
person believes that a defense lawyer must refuse to put on the best possible
case for the client, forcing the state to prove every element beyond a
reasonable doubt. The prohibition on defending a proceeding without a
sufficient basis in law and fact is expressly qualified by a permission for
criminal defense lawyers to “so defend the proceeding as to require that

168. See Carter, supra note 53, at 133–34 (“A typical aspirational use of the term by the Supreme
Court is found in Hickman v. Taylor: ‘Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to
work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients.’”
(quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510)).
169. See supra notes 110–45 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 189.
171. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to
engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”).
172. See supra note 35, for a discussion of the Court’s subtle misreading of the requirement of
Rule 3.3(a).
173. Some commentators would even relax the rule against presenting false testimony in
recognition of the psychology of persuasion—i.e., that it takes a story to beat a story. See, e.g., John B.
Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin’s Position on the Criminal
Lawyer’s “Different Mission”, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339, 33–40 (1987) (discussing the ethics of a
criminal defense lawyer within the criminal justice system and arguing the nature of the criminal justice
system is not dedicated to the pursuit of truth). Monroe Freedman famously argued that the duty of
candor to the tribunal should be subordinated to the lawyer’s duty to represent the interests of the
accused. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469–70 (1966).
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every element of the case be established.”174 The state did not identify any
rule of professional conduct requiring the lawyer to concede McCoy’s
guilt,175 because it could not—no one thinks that the lawyer’s role as an
officer of the court extends to refusing to provide a vigorous defense of
even a weak case.
As mentioned above, there is reason to worry that lazy or incompetent
lawyers will read McCoy as tacitly permitting a half-hearted defense where
the client appears insistent upon pursuing a bizarre theory of the case, or
perhaps not putting on any evidence at all. The digression in McCoy
prompted by the state’s inapposite speculation about the lawyer’s ethical
duties in that case, should not be understood as contemplating anything
other than a full-throated defense of the client’s interests. The only issue
dealt with in McCoy is the allocation of authority between lawyer and client
to determine the content of those interests. It does not diminish the lawyer’s
advocacy role one bit.
3. The decision-making process contemplated by the Restatement is
highly contextual. It requires consideration of “the client’s circumstances,
problems, needs, character, and values, including interests of the client
beyond the matter in which the lawyer represents the client.”176 It is
unrealistic to expect any court to articulate a meta-norm that is general
enough to be useful beyond a specific case, yet specific enough to capture
all of the factors relevant to the lawyer’s decision. A critical part of the
decision-making process is specifying the relevant values and balancing
among them.177 The lawyer’s deliberation may resemble the process by
which a court considers competing factors before making a decision and
articulating a reason for it.178 This task demands judgment and experience,
and a lawyer may benefit from seeking the guidance of colleagues.179 In
many cases there will be no alternative to muddling through, with due
174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1.
175. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1510 (2018) (“Louisiana has identified no ethical
rule requiring English to admit McCoy’s guilt over McCoy’s objection.”).
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. d. (AM. LAW
INST. 2001).
177. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 48, at 28–37.
178. See, e.g., id. at 34 (suggesting a good decision-making process is one in which the act of
balancing involves the specification of norms that incorporates one’s reasons).
179. The Model Rules permit revelation of confidential information to the extent reasonably
necessary to secure legal advice concerning compliance with the rules of professional conduct. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4).

134

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 9:92

sensitivity to the values of autonomy, loyalty to the client and the fairness
and reliability of the litigation process. Moreover, the Restatement
emphasizes that the lawyer will often be facing a series of imperfect
alternatives and will, in effect, be looking for the least-worst option.180 As
a result, it recommends that a lawyer who “acts reasonably and in good faith
in perplexing circumstances” should not be exposed to professional
discipline or an action by the client for malpractice or breach of fiduciary
duty.181 The “reasonably and in good faith” qualification is important, but
one aspect of proceeding reasonably is not assuming that autonomy or
countervailing values (fairness, reliability, etc.) are absolute and should
necessarily determine what should be done in a particular case.
4. Both the Restatement and the Model Rules direct the lawyer to
maintain a normal lawyer-client relationship, to the extent possible.182 One
of the hallmarks of a well-functioning lawyer-client relationship is trust. A
client who believes his lawyer is working against his interests will likely begin
to mistrust the lawyer. Attempts at persuasion are of course lawyers’ stock
in trade, but they must never attempt to deceive or manipulate their clients
into making the decision that the lawyer believes is consistent with the
client’s long range-interests. The Restatement comments do contemplate a
limited role for deception in instances where conveying truthful information
would cause the client to commit suicide or harm others.183 Outside that
unusual situation, outright lying is a clear violation of the rules of
professional conduct,184 as well as a breach of the lawyer’s fiduciary duty to
the client. The interesting questions pertain to the permissibility of cajoling,
pleading, shading the truth, slow-walking a decision, and other strategies
short of outright untruthfulness. Lawyers whose clients wish to “volunteer”
for execution report employing a wide range of strategies, enlisting family
members and friends, listening patiently to client concerns, and appealing to
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. b. (“This
Section recognizes that a lawyer must often exercise an informed professional judgment in choosing
among those imperfect alternatives.”).
181. Id. at cmt. d.
182. Id. § 24(1); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a).
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. c. (“A lawyer
may properly withhold from a disabled client information that would harm the client . . . .”).
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (“In the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail
to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client . . . .”).
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interests such as not wanting to let down one’s family or give in to the
system.185 In fact, many lawyers believe (rightly in my view) that neglecting
to attempt to persuade the client to act in his own best interests would be a
violation of their ethical duties.186 This requires a great deal of effort to
build trust, including many hours of listening to clients (not just talking to
them), going off on a few wild goose chases suggested by the client, and
otherwise acting like someone the client can believe has his best interest at
heart.
5. Finally, and to reiterate, the degree of competency required by gray
zone defendants to make a self-defeating choice should vary directly with
the importance of the interest at stake.187 The sliding-scale approach to
competency and autonomy is relatively easy to reconcile with decisions
regarding trial tactics—what Model Rule 1.2(a) refers to as decisions with
respect to the means by which the client’s ends are to be pursued.188
Justice Ginsburg implies without saying so expressly that the lawyer’s
concession of guilt in McCoy is tantamount to a guilty plea, and under the
allocation of authority in Rule 1.2(a), the decision to plead guilty is
exclusively for the client to make.189 However, it is also arguable that,
where the non-autonomy interests of the client are sufficiently weighty—
for example, where the defendant’s life is at stake—a court may permit
defense counsel to represent the client in a way that upsets the usual
allocation of decision-making authority. The self-representation right in
Faretta is qualified in many ways. There is no constitutional prohibition, for
185. See Harrington, supra note 53, at 863–64 (explaining three strategies lawyers use when
dissuading clients from volunteering are: “the ‘direct’ approach, the ‘indirect’ approach, and the
‘listening’ approach”).
186. See id. at 863 n.19. As one lawyer put it, upon learning of the client’s desire to waive appeals
and proceed to execution, it would be irresponsible to simply accept that instruction without
conducting a further investigation and trying to talk the client out of the decision.
187. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 103, at 118–19.
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (defining the scope of a lawyer’s
representation).
189. McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508–09 (2018). Justice Alito, in dissent,
distinguishes (1) admitting guilt of an offense and (2) conceding the factual predicate for an element of
the offense. See id. at 1514–17 (Alito, J., dissenting). Technically Alito is correct, but the only difference
it makes for the ethical analysis is that a decision to plead guilty is inherently, non-waivable within the
client’s authority, while a decision to concede factual but not legal guilt is almost certainly a decision
concerning the objectives of representation, which is the client’s to make. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (“In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the
client will testify.”).
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example, on the appointment of standby counsel to assist in various ways at
trial.190 The Court in that case noted that Faretta establishes the defendant’s
right to have his voice heard, but does not limit the participation of others
in the defendant’s trial.191 However, because the core of the Faretta right is
“to preserve actual control over the case [the defendant] chooses to present
to the jury[,]”192 there should be a strong presumption in favor of the usual
allocation of decision-making authority, particularly in non-capital cases.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the ironies of McCoy is its subordination of the values of fairness,
reliability, and professional control in a case presenting the most serious
risks to the client if the lawyer provides ineffective representation. The
client’s most urgent need in a capital case is for a lawyer with the capability
of sparing his life. In cases involving less weighty matters, lawyers have a
stronger claim to decision-making authority. Indeed, outside the context of
criminal defense, lawyers have a duty to ensure that the claims and defenses
they assert have adequate factual and legal grounding.193 Those cases also
involve interference with the client’s autonomy, but that interference is
accepted as necessary for the vindication of other values, such as the fairness
and reliability of the proceedings. Lawyers rightly must consider both values
in determining the ethical course of action, but McCoy seems to suggest that
autonomy has near-absolute weight in a context in which the need for
effective representation is greatest.

190. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187–88 (1984).
191. See id. at 176–77 (“Faretta itself dealt with the defendant’s affirmative right to participate,
not with the limits on standby counsel’s additional involvement.”).
192. Id. at 178.
193. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so
that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.”); see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (defining the standards of representations made to a
federal court, along with outlining possible sanctions).

